

TOP SECRET

2 January 1963

Copy No. C 80-5

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

2 January 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

25X1

2. Congo: Tshombé sets conditions for return to Elisabethville. (Page 3)
3. Communist China - USSR: People's Daily editorial on Sino-Soviet dispute. (Page 4)

25X1

7. Japan: Ikeda may dissolve the Diet's lower house this month. (Page 9)
8. Peru: Junta may move to counteract Communist-inspired strikes and violence. (Page 10)

25X1

10. Notes: Belgium, USSR-Ghana. (Page 12)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5



*Congo: [Tshombé, now in Jadotville, has agreed to come immediately to Elisabethville on condition that his freedom be guaranteed and the US, UK, and Belgian consuls escort him from the Lufira River. Tshombé has also asked for a meeting with a UN representative "not engaged in operations in progress" and has confirmed his adherence to U Thant's reconciliation plan.]

[Initial reaction by UN Under Secretary Bunche was that the time for negotiations has passed and that Tshombé must take the actions specified in U Thant's 31 December statement, including assurance that UN forces be allowed to move freely throughout Katanga.]

[Other actions called for in Thant's statement included sending senior officers of Katanga's gendarmerie to Leopoldville to take an oath of allegiance to the President of the Republic, authorizing a representative of the National Bank of Katanga to go to Leopoldville at once, elimination of all mercenaries from Katanga, and acceptance of customs and immigration officers of the central government.]

[Thant made it clear that he will tolerate no long delay and warned that further attacks on the UN forces will meet with a "quick and sharp response." He also reminded Adoula of the steps he expects him to take forthwith.]

[The US consul in Elisabethville noted on 31 December that Tshombé was still capable of doing great harm, and that it was by no means clear that he is ready to discuss Katangan reintegration in a reasonable manner. The mercenaries in Kipushi reportedly escaped intact before the UN occupied]

the city, and have regrouped to the north. Other reports indicate that Kolwezi is heavily defended by the Katangan gendarmerie and some 250 mercenaries.]

25X1 [UN commanders in Katanga apparently intend to extend military control where they can do so without heavy fighting. On 1 January UN columns from Elisabethville were still advancing toward Jadotville. The buildup of UN forces and equipment, particularly aircraft, will continue.]

25X1 [Adoula can be expected shortly to press for establishment of a central government presence in Elisabethville. The Congolese Army (ANC) is continuing plans to move ANC troops into southern Katanga, and Defense Minister Anany has requested a US airlift for this purpose.] 25X1

25X1
2 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

3-a

Communist China - USSR: Peiping claims that it has been forced into a new round of polemics by the public attacks on China made by Italian party leader Togliatti and "certain other comrades."

A 13,000-word editorial in the People's Daily of 31 December indicates that Peiping is prepared to deepen the crisis in Sino-Soviet relations by continuing its thinly veiled attacks on Khrushchev. For example, his course in Cuba is characterized as "100-percent appeasement, a Munich pure and simple."

Khrushchev's observation before the Supreme Soviet on 12 December that paper tigers had "nuclear teeth" is rebutted with the affirmation that the paper tiger concept is valid "no matter what kind of teeth" the imperialists bare.

The editorial constitutes one of Peiping's most scathing condemnations of timidity in Soviet strategy. It ridicules fears that local conflicts may spark a third World War and scores statements that promote a dread of nuclear war. It insists further that Communist policy must envisage the achievement of a "great nuclear superiority."

On other occasions, the Chinese have indicated that more than one country of the bloc would have to contribute to this superiority. Implicitly protesting Soviet disapproval of this line of thought, Foreign Minister Chen Yi declared last month that China would not abandon her right to nuclear arms and that it was "unfair for the nuclear powers to try to prevent the expansion of nuclear weapons."

Peiping's militant view of correct Communist strategy is further expressed in the rebuke of the

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

Italian Communist Party for highlighting the possibility of the peaceful accession of the Communists to power. The Chinese concede that dual tactics--parliamentary and violent--should be employed, but they belittle the possibility of peaceful transition.

25X1

2 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

5

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

Japan: Prime Minister Ikeda may dissolve the lower house of the Diet this month and call for general elections.

Ikeda's advisers believe that if elections were held soon, his Liberal Democratic Party would be able to capitalize on the public's disapproval of the Socialist Party's obstructionism during the recent special Diet session.

Ikeda could probably maintain his position as party leader if only a few seats were lost. Larger losses would lead to a new round of intra-party fighting even though the Liberal Democrats probably would still hold a substantial majority.

The extremist Socialist elements primarily responsible for the obstructionism regard filibusters and threats to boycott a regular Diet session as the only means they can effectively use to get the government to adjust legislation to their wishes. These elements feel that, while the Socialists have little chance of taking over the government, the long-term trend toward a larger leftist vote assures their party of some gains regardless of criticism of their tactics.

25X1

2 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

9

25X1

25X1

Peru: The spread of Communist-inspired strikes and violence may spur the governing junta to more energetic counteraction.

There have already been outbreaks in five major cities in the past week, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Two generals, not members of the junta, have stated independently that troops will probably be sent to help police in districts where constitutional guarantees have been suspended. Troops moved into some of the affected areas before Christmas but the junta has not yet permitted them to help local police forces.

Junta leaders now admit privately that Communists were involved in the La Oroya violence on 17 December, but still prefer to center their attention on the non-Communist opposition. Two cabinet ministers have separately told American officials that "the oligarchy" together with APRA and followers of former president Prado are trying to discredit the junta and make it impossible to hold promised elections in June.

Top APRA officials have denied earlier reports that APRA-led unions are about to launch a strike campaign. APRA does not wish to give the junta any pretext for excluding it from the elections. [REDACTED]

25X1

2 Jan 63

DAILY BRIEF

10

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

NOTES

25X1 Belgium: Public criticism of Foreign Minister Spaak for his Congo policy continues to grow, encouraged by British and French criticism of the UN military moves. US Ambassador MacArthur believes, however, that early completion of UN military operations in Katanga will permit the Belgian Government to survive. 25X1

25X1 USSR-Ghana: The Soviet merchant ship Frolovo reportedly unloaded an arms shipment at the Ghanaian port of Takoradi on 21 December. The arms, which included 10 armored personnel carriers, three armored trucks, and rifles and ammunition, probably were contracted for during the visit of the Ghanaian minister of Defense to Moscow last July. It is possible that the arms will be used to equip the special Ghanaian brigade for the Joint African High Command being developed by the Casablanca group of African states. 25X1

2 Jan 63

12

25X1

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U. S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2003/03/10 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800010001-5

TOP SECRET